

**Optimal Rebate Key**  
**for an Equitable Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme**

**Dr Andre Stochniol**  
Founder, IMERS\*

andre@imers.org  
London, UK, May 2011

---

\* The contents of this paper are the author's sole responsibility.  
This paper may be copied and distributed free of charge if appropriate citation is given; an electronic copy is available at: [imers.org/docs/rebateKey.pdf](http://imers.org/docs/rebateKey.pdf)

*Acknowledgements*

To my wife Halina and daughters, Nina and Kasia. This paper would not have been possible without their incredible support and patience during the last 4 years, as I switched from a business career to the public good initiative known as the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS).

## Abstract

The Rebate Mechanism proposal is currently under consideration at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It proposes to reconcile the principles of the UNFCCC with the global IMO regime by rebating the economic cost incurred by a developing country participating in a global market-based measure for greenhouse gas emissions from international maritime transport (maritime MBM).

This study provides detailed information on identifying an optimal rebate key to ensure no net incidence (cost burden) on developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable, from the application of a maritime MBM. A country's share of global imports from non-adjacent countries is proposed as the basis for the optimal key to be used with the Rebate Mechanism or any revenue-raising MBM under IMO consideration, for all countries irrespective of their trade distances. Rebate keys for over 150 developing countries and attribution keys for developed countries are calculated. Comprehensive justification for the calculations, including trade-weighted distances for countries, as well as conditions to integrate the optimal rebate key with the MBM proposals under consideration at the IMO, are provided. The provided keys could also apply to international aviation.

## CONTENTS

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| <b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>  | <b>4</b>  |
| <b>1. DIFFERENTIATION IMPASSE.....</b>                                      | <b>4</b>  |
| 1.1. PURPOSE OF A MARKET-BASED MEASURE .....                                | 4         |
| 1.2. OPPOSITION TO PROPOSALS CONSIDERED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE IMO ..... | 5         |
| 1.3. COMPLEXITY OF EXCLUDING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES .....                     | 6         |
| 1.4. COMPLEXITY OF ATTRIBUTING EMISSIONS AND COST BURDEN.....               | 6         |
| 1.5. REBATE MECHANISM (RM) .....  | 7         |
| <b>2. DATA SELECTED.....</b>  | <b>8</b>  |
| 2.1. IMPORTS RATHER THE EXPORTS .....                                       | 8         |
| 2.2. VALUE RATHER THAN VOLUME .....   | 9         |
| 2.3. WHY NOT USE OVERALL IMPORTS? .....                                     | 9         |
| 2.4. USING COMBINED AIR AND SEA DATA.....                                   | 10        |
| <b>3. DERIVING GLOBAL IMPORTS BY SEA AND AIR .....</b>                      | <b>11</b> |
| 3.1. TRADE WITH NON-ADJACENT PARTNERS.....                                  | 11        |
| 3.2. TRADE WITH NON-ADJACENT PARTNERS, ADJUSTED (TNAP).....                 | 11        |
| 3.3. TNAP ALGORITHM AND CALCULATIONS .....                                  | 12        |
| 3.4. COUNTRY SHARE OF GLOBAL IMPORTS BY SEA AND AIR.....                    | 12        |
| <b>4. IMPACT OF DISTANCE.....</b>   | <b>13</b> |
| 4.1. TRADE-WEIGHTED DISTANCES (TWD) .....                                   | 13        |
| 4.2. EXCLUDING DISTANCE FROM CALCULATIONS .....                             | 16        |
| <b>5. OPTIMAL ATTRIBUTION KEY AND ITS APPLICATION .....</b>                 | <b>17</b> |
| 5.1. INTEGRATION CONDITIONS .....   | 18        |
| 5.2. INTEGRATION WITH MBM PROPOSALS .....                                   | 18        |
| <b>6. CONCLUSIONS.....</b>  | <b>20</b> |
| <b>ANNEX 1 – OVERVIEW OF PROPOSALS.....</b>                                 | <b>22</b> |
| <b>ANNEX 2 – REBATE AND ATTRIBUTION KEYS.....</b>                           | <b>27</b> |
| <b>BIBLIOGRAPHY.....</b>  | <b>22</b> |

## Introduction

1 This paper explores a way forward to agree an equitable scheme to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from international maritime transport (maritime emissions).<sup>1</sup> Specifically it studies how to compensate poor countries for the scheme's incidence through a Rebate Mechanism (RM) under consideration at the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It focuses on identifying an optimal "attribution key" for RM, which strikes the best balance between accuracy, simplicity of calculation and data availability. It recommends a country's share of value of imports from non-adjacent countries, adjusted for trade patterns in Europe and in Latin America, as the optimal key. Finally, it calculates the attribution key for 190 countries.

2 The paper is structured as follows. Following this introduction, Section 1 outlines the "differentiation impasse" in addressing maritime emissions. Section 2 discusses data selected for the attribution key. Section 3 introduces a new approach to derive global imports by sea and air. Section 4 analyzes the impact of trade distance. Section 5 provides results for the optimal attribution key and discusses its application. Section 6 concludes.

## 1. DIFFERENTIATION IMPASSE

### 1.1. Purpose of a Market-Based Measure

3 Various proposals for a Market Based Measure (MBM) for GHG emissions from international shipping aim to address one and/or two complex challenges facing the international community. One of the challenges is how to cost-effectively reduce GHG emissions from international shipping which are large in absolute terms, and not covered under the Kyoto Protocol, or any other international regulation. Another challenge relates to the scaling-up of financing for climate change action, particularly for adaptation to climate change impacts. Current financial mechanisms aimed at helping the world's poor deal with the consequences of global warming are inadequate in both scale and predictability, and financing from a maritime MBM could reduce the gap in funding needed.

4 Both challenges require solutions respecting equity, between countries and between actions by different transport sectors. They also require unprecedented global cooperation.

5 In 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries committed, in the context of meaningful actions and transparency on implementation, to a goal of mobilizing jointly US\$100 billion per year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This goal was subsequently recognized in the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010).

6 The High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF), established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pointed at carbon pricing of international transport emissions as an important potential source of climate financing (and mitigation) that could contribute substantially towards mobilizing the US\$100 billion committed annually. The AGF's key recommendation was that there should be no net incidence on developing countries from any scheme raising climate financing (AGF 2010a). The AGF's analysis of international transport concluded that universal-application cost impacts on particular countries could be addressed via a well-designed compensation mechanism to address

---

<sup>1</sup> The previous version of this paper, that excludes Appendix 1 and the EIS proposal, is incorporated in the IMO document GHG-WG 3/3/11, available at: [www.imers.org/ghg-wg3](http://www.imers.org/ghg-wg3).

equity and political acceptability concerns. The same analysis identified the rebate approach, described in the Rebate Mechanism proposal (document MEPC 60/4/55), as a compensation mechanism that could address the incidence issue in international maritime transport (AGF 2010b).

## 1.2. Opposition to proposals considered under the auspices of the IMO

7 It is generally agreed that any MBM for international maritime transport should be global and apply to all ships irrespective of the flag they fly, for legal reasons, and in order to avoid evasions and competitive distortions. Thus all MBM proposals currently being considered by the IMO assume application to all ships. They are (see Appendix 1 for their overview):

- .1 International Fund for GHG emissions from ships (GHG Fund);
- .2 Emission Trading System (ETS);
- .3 Port State Levy (PSL);
- .4 Ship Efficiency Credit Trading (SECT);
- .5 Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS);
- .6 Rebate Mechanism (RM).

8 None of the above proposals, except the Rebate Mechanism (RM), differentiate explicitly between developed and developing countries and are therefore opposed by many developing countries. Developing countries maintain that the UNFCCC principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) must apply to the climate change regime in the IMO.

9 All the above proposals, with the exception of SECT, can raise revenue. Some of them consider disbursing the majority of the revenue raised for climate change action in developing countries. Discussions at the IMO and UNFCCC have shown that such an approach is not generally perceived by developing countries as sufficient to fulfil the UNFCCC principle of CBDR. It became clear that the heart of the matter for many developing countries is “who really pays” for the MBM.

10 Assuming a global application of an MBM, the cost incurred by the shipping industry will be mostly passed on to consumers in both developed and developing countries. Depending on local competition for imported goods, a portion of the cost may also be passed on to producers (exporters). Some developing countries will therefore carry a share of the burden of the MBM, unless every developing country gains more than the total cost burden to its economy. In this context, arguably, none of the above proposals so far truly incorporate the principle of CBDR, regardless of their revenue raising potential.

11 Consider an example where the majority of the MBM revenue raised is spent on purchasing emission credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in developing countries, in order to offset maritime emissions growth. The GHG Fund is an example of such an approach. In this scenario, many developing countries would in fact carry a share of the MBM burden as they would receive less than their cost incurred. The reason is that an

overwhelming majority of CDM projects are concentrated in just a few countries.<sup>2</sup> Many developing countries, especially smaller ones, would therefore be net contributors to the generated funds, rather than being beneficiaries. The funds would go to the larger, often more advanced developing countries. This is at odds with both the equity and the CBDR principle. It is also against the UNFCCC obligations and commitments of developed countries to provide climate financing.

12 Broadening the revenue disbursement to other categories, such as adaptation and forestry, is unlikely to resolve the equity issue. As recent negotiations suggest, the opposition of developing countries to raising financing from all countries is based on fundamental principles, and thus is likely to remain strong. Even though some countries or their groups may become net MBM beneficiaries, others would not. The opposition from poor countries that anticipate a significant cost burden, and no benefits, is likely to remain strong.

### **1.3. Complexity of excluding developing countries**

13 In theory, it could be more efficient to exclude developing countries from participation in a MBM altogether so as to comply with the CBDR and avoid the complexity associated with compensating these countries for the cost burden that falls on them. This would require differentiating the application of an MBM based on final destination of goods. This option was proposed in the second generation of the IMERS proposal, and was thoroughly studied (Stochniol 2009a). Ships transporting goods to developed countries would be covered, while ships transporting goods to developing countries would not. Ships transporting goods to both developed and developing countries would be partially covered. Such an approach would eliminate, from the outset, any impact on developing countries.

14 However, the approach based on the final destination of goods although relatively simple for tankers and dry bulk carriers proved complex for ships carrying multiple goods, particularly for container ships. It would require obtaining a verifiable share of goods transported to developed countries by each ship or company worldwide. Given the tens of thousands of ships operating worldwide, collecting and validating such information would require significant administrative efforts. This complexity was recognized also by various experts and negotiators from developing countries, and the proposal was not formally tabled at the IMO.

### **1.4. Complexity of attributing emissions and cost burden**

15 The current approach for reporting GHG emissions from international shipping, under the UNFCCC, is based on the amount of fuel sold in a country to ships engaged in international transport (called international bunker fuels). This approach was found to be inadequate as it underestimates the emissions for countries that sell a disproportionately low amount of international bunker fuels, such as the United Kingdom (UK). For instance, if the emissions from international shipping were calculated based on the share of unloaded goods or the share of imports, and similar, the UK's share of shipping emissions would be circa six times more than currently reported based on fuel sold (Stochniol 2009b, Gilbert et al 2010). The fuel-based approach also overestimates the emissions for countries with high fuel sales, such as the Netherlands and Singapore. No other superior option to report or account for

---

<sup>2</sup> According to the UNEP Risoe, CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, available at [www.cdmpipeline.org](http://www.cdmpipeline.org), as well as World Bank 2009, approximately 90% of all CDM credits have been issued so far to projects in four countries: China, India, South Korea and Brazil, with circa 48% issued to projects in China.

these emissions has been found thus far. The problem directly relates to the complexity of international shipping. Whether ship or trade data is considered, the emission calculation and attribution is complex.

16 Attributing shipping emissions based on data relating to the ship, such as the origin of the voyage, the destination or the volume of goods transported is complex and not equitable, given that ships often transport goods to many countries. This is especially true for container ships where for instance a container ship en route from Asia to Europe may drop-off a few containers in an African port (say less than 1% of all containers carried to Europe). Attributing all emissions from the Asia-Africa leg of the voyage to an African country, or similar, would not be equitable. It would overlook the fact that the majority of containers carried were destined to Europe. Furthermore, from a practical standpoint alone, making a direct calculation of emissions attributable to different countries based on cargo transported to them would be administratively complex.

17 Attributing shipping emissions to a country based on the volume of its seaborne trade and distances travelled by ships is not much simpler. As different ship types have significantly different energy efficiency performances (per tonne-km of cargo carried), attributing ship emissions to countries would be difficult as this would require including data on the energy efficiency of the ships. For most countries, data for such calculations are not readily available.

18 If the calculation of emissions attributed to countries seems complex, the calculation of a country's cost burden generated by a MBM is even more complex. The reason is that freight rates are determined by multiple variables, as reported by Wilmsmeier and Hoffman (2008), Korinek and Sourdin (2009), and UNCTAD (2010a) for instance. Some of the major variables determining freight rates include the ship type, the trade volumes (economies of scale), the trade imbalances (especially for container traffic), the price of fuel, the type and value of goods carried, the distance travelled (or time spent at sea), the competition level, the port infrastructure and efficiency, and the relevant regulatory requirements. For example, the cost of transporting a container from Asia to the United States (US) is double the cost of transporting the container in the opposite direction, reflecting in particular the impact of the trade imbalances that affect the Asia-US container trade route.

19 Introducing an MBM may increase the freight rates in various ways, depending on the relevant determinants of freight rates and the prevailing market conditions. Thus creating an accurate formula that could precisely determine the size of the cost burden of an MBM for all countries is impossible. What is warranted however, is a formula or attribution key that is perceived as fair, supported by reliable data, and closely approximates the burden born by countries.

## **1.5. Rebate Mechanism (RM)**

20 It has been proposed that in order to comply with the principles of the UNFCCC, the application of a maritime MBM has to be differentiated. Developing countries could recover the cost of the MBM through an agreed rebate mechanism, thus ensuring at the least no net incidence to any developing country, and a positive net benefit to any developing country that received climate change assistance. Furthermore, the most vulnerable countries should benefit the most through additional means, such as the disbursement of net financing raised.

21 Under the proposed rebate mechanism (RM), each developing country would be entitled to obtain an unconditional payment (rebate) equal to the attributed burden of its participation

in the maritime MBM.<sup>3</sup> The amount of the rebate would be calculated annually from the global MBM costs using a simple country-level “attribution key”. A country’s share of global imports was the proposed “attribution key”, given that relevant data is readily available.<sup>4</sup> In this paper, it is further proposed to constrain the import statistics to data from non-adjacent countries (in order to exclude data on imports between countries that share a land border, which typically relates to land transport). Details of this approach and other alternative “attribution keys” are discussed in the following section.

22 Under the proposed rebate scheme, a developing country could decide to forego its rebate, or a part of it, and be internationally recognized for such action. This provides additional flexibility to reflect the different national circumstances of developing countries.<sup>5</sup> Developed countries are not entitled to any rebates, and are automatically credited for the amount of financing raised through the MBM, based on the same attribution key, namely a country’s share of global imports. Consequently, the net revenue raised after rebates have been issued, would come from consumers in developed countries only, complying therefore with the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC.

23 The proposed RM does not specify how the net revenue raised should be used. However, since the revenue is generated from international activity, it seems that it should be used in its entirety for international purposes rather than to contribute to national budgets. The net revenue could be split between supporting developing countries in implementing climate change action and assisting the global shipping sector in accelerating reductions of its growing emissions through technological advances. The disbursement of this net revenue could be managed by the operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, according to relevant rules and provisions. This could be the Green Climate Fund (GCF) established in the Cancun Agreements (UNFCCC 2010). Thus, developing countries would be beneficiaries of the revenue generated by the MBM, with the more vulnerable countries benefiting the most. The shipping sector should also benefit potentially through a maritime funding window in GCF, or a new global Maritime Technology Fund, or similar, which should be established given the need to invest in clean technology development and transfer in the maritime sector.

24 The RM can therefore apply, in principle, to any maritime MBM which generates revenue, such as a contribution or a levy on fuel, or an emission trading scheme. The mechanism cannot apply to an MBM that does not generate revenue.

## **2. DATA SELECTED**

### **2.1. Imports rather the exports**

25 Given that most of the transport costs are passed on to the final customers, data on country’s imports is selected rather than exports, or the sum of imports and exports, or any other combination.

---

<sup>3</sup> According to the RM proposal, the rebate, or a part of it, could be used for climate change action, subject to a sovereign decision by the receiving country Party.

<sup>4</sup> The RM proposal anticipates that Parties could replace the use of imports by value with another more accurate measure when such information becomes available (for instance by a country’s share of global seaborne imports by value, or similar).

<sup>5</sup> A rebate rate or multiplier from 0 to 1 may also be agreed, and recorded for each developing country. When it is 0, the developing country would agree to forego its entire rebate, and be internationally recognized for such action, for instance within a climate change agreement or otherwise.

## 2.2. Value rather than volume

26 Value of imports rather than volume (weight) is selected primarily because of readily available data. Value of imports is typically collected by customs, is easy to aggregate and is reported centrally in all countries, including those which are land-locked, and thus the aggregated data is unlikely to be challenged by governments. This contrasts with volume of imports (weight) which is not generally available in many countries, as some ports do not collect all relevant data, especially regarding final destination of unloaded cargo. Generally trade by weight is not measured as precisely as trade by value.

27 Looking at the value of goods carried by different ships shows that there is a correlation between the value of goods carried and the emission rate of the ship. Bulk goods, which are low value, are carried by bulk ships with the lowest emission rate. Manufactured goods, which are high value, are carried by fast container ships that have much higher emission rates than slower bulk ships per tonne-km carried. Although even lower value goods are increasingly transported by containers, on average the value-efficiency relationship holds true for containers.<sup>6</sup> Thus the value of imported cargo alone is needed. In contrast, using cargo volume would also require knowledge of the efficiency of ships carrying the cargo, making such calculations administratively complex, and often impossible as relevant data is not collected.

28 Yet another argument for using value is that it would better reflect the burden of any emission reduction regime to small countries, including many small island developing states (SIDS), which are away from well served and competitive markets. For these remote countries prices of imported commodities and goods are typically higher than for the well connected countries, and thus the share of imports by value would yield higher results than if calculated based on volume of imports, and as such is more equitable. Finally, using value rather than volume allows combining trade by sea and air as they are of similar order. Combining volume (weight) of trade by sea and air does not make sense as these differ typically by two orders of magnitude. A separate question whether or not to include distance is discussed in a dedicated section Impact of Distance.

## 2.3. Why not use overall imports?

29 Country-level data on global imports by value is readily available, for instance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2009) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2010c), in contrast to data on seaborne imports which is not generally available. Thus a country's share of global imports (overall, by value) is also readily available, and can be used as a simple key to proxy the country's share of global seaborne imports. However, for countries that trade extensively by land (i.e. road, train and pipeline) this proxy would overestimate their share of seaborne imports. For islands that trade exclusively by sea and air, such proxy would underestimate its share of seaborne imports, given that it would be derived by dividing by the overall global imports that incorporates additionally the imports by land. The share of imports was originally proposed by the author as an initial measure, until another more precise option or data became available (IUCN 2010). The above example of islands trading exclusively by sea and air suggest that using such data should be investigated.

---

<sup>6</sup> Detailed calculations by the author for various ship types confirmed this general relationship, and are available from the author. In this study only overall results for sea and air transport are provided.

## 2.4. Using combined air and sea data

30 Splitting the value of trade carried by international transport, into seaborne and airborne, is difficult, as the air-sea split may vary between countries, and no relevant data exists for the majority of countries. However, analysis of the emission intensity of international transport per dollar of cargo carried provides justification that additional accuracy gained may be marginal, while effort very significant.

31 Generally low-value cargo is carried by sea and high-value by air. The difference in average value per tonne of cargo transported by air and sea is significant, circa 70 fold, or more.<sup>7</sup> However the difference between average emission rates between ships and aircraft is also very significant, circa 70 fold, with all types of ships being much more efficient than aircraft per tonne-km of carried cargo. For instance average emission rates for seaborne and airborne transport in 2007 are calculated as 14.9 gCO<sub>2</sub>/tonne-km and 1,029 gCO<sub>2</sub>/tonne-km, respectively.<sup>8</sup>

32 To a great degree, these two effects balance each other out for these two transport modes. Thus the emission intensity of trade, defined as the amount of emissions per dollar of carried cargo, is of the same order of magnitude for seaborne and airborne trade, confirming the usage of value measure to proxy responsibility for emissions even between two different transport modes. For 2007, the emission intensity for international seaborne trade is calculated as 113 gCO<sub>2</sub>/US\$ of cargo carried.<sup>9</sup> The emission intensity for international aviation is estimated to be of similar order of magnitude.<sup>10</sup>

33 Thus the value of imports by sea and air can be used to proxy emissions attributable to a country from international maritime transport. If in a given country the split between imports by sea and air were significantly different than in another country, these would balance out for the reasons provided above, providing a similar approach were used for aviation. Any inaccuracy of attributing more usage of international aviation to a country that uses it a little would balance out by attributing more usage of international shipping to this country. This could also allow an approach to compensate the cost burden resulting from a MBM for international aviation, but such considerations are outside the scope of this study.

---

<sup>7</sup> For instance average value per tonne of cargo imported to the United States in 2007 was US\$968 and US\$88,143, for sea and air modes respectively. Obtained using the Freight Analysis Framework, Federal Highway Administration, United States Department of Transportation; available at [http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight\\_analysis/faf/](http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/freight/freight_analysis/faf/)

<sup>8</sup> The emission rate for international maritime transport is calculated by dividing its total emissions of 870 MtCO<sub>2</sub> by the seaborne transport work of 58,199 billion tonne-km (as per IMO 2009 and UNCTAD 2010b data for 2007). The emission rate for international aviation is calculated by dividing its emissions of 380 MtCO<sub>2</sub> by airborne transport work of 369.40 billion revenue tonne kilometres, RTK (as per ICAO data for 2007; The ICAO Journal vol. 64, No. 1, 2009; available at [http://www.icao.int/icao/en/jr/2009/6401\\_en.pdf](http://www.icao.int/icao/en/jr/2009/6401_en.pdf)).

<sup>9</sup> The emission intensity for international maritime transport is calculated by dividing its emissions of 870 MtCO<sub>2</sub> by the total seaborne exports of \$7,723 billions in 2007 (trade data from US DOT 2010).

<sup>10</sup> The data for international airborne trade, that includes intra-EU, is practically not available. At the time of writing various estimates are being validated.

### 3. DERIVING GLOBAL IMPORTS BY SEA AND AIR

#### 3.1. Trade with non-adjacent partners

34 Three-quarters of world trade by value takes place between countries that do not share a land border, and nearly all of this trade moves via sea and air, as noted by Hummels (2009). This is typical for developing countries, especially in Africa. For islands, all of their trade is by air or sea, unless there is some trade by pipeline or the island is connected to another country by a bridge, but these are rare. There are some exceptions though, mostly in the developed world. In Europe notable trade by land takes place between various non-adjacent land countries, for instance between Italy and Germany, given small distances (proximity), good roads and rail links.

35 Thus, a country's share of global trade between non-land-adjacent partners, by value, is a simple proxy for a country's seaborne and airborne trade combined. It is especially viable for islands and developing countries. Given that it effectively excludes trade by land for many countries, it is significantly better than a country's share of global imports, which was proposed as the initial measure for the rebate mechanism (document MEPC 60/4/55).

36 For instance, for each island the new proxy would be approximately one third larger than the initial one, given that the denominator in the share calculations would be lower, circa three-quarters of all world trade. This new proxy can be improved further by implementing adjustments for areas where it is less accurate.

#### 3.2. Trade with non-adjacent partners, adjusted (TNAP)

37 An effective approach to improve further the above proxy is to adjust the definition of an adjacent partner (AP) as follows. Two countries that are land-adjacent are adjacent partners (APs). Any island country that is connected to another country, via bridge, tunnel or similar, is an AP of that country, and vice-versa<sup>11</sup>. Any two countries in Europe that are two borders apart are also APs (such as Germany and Italy). A non-adjacent partner (NAP) is any country that is not an AP. The above approach was selected to reflect the greater share of land transport for various countries which are close by but not-land-adjacent, namely for countries in Europe and islands having land transport connections to mainland.<sup>12</sup>

38 Furthermore, to reflect significant air and sea transport between certain APs that are far apart, the real values of the share of trade by land between them are used. This applies to the U.S., Canada and Latin America countries and their main APs.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> In the case of the United Kingdom (UK), which is connected by the Channel Tunnel with mainland Europe, two countries are set as adjacent to the UK, France and Belgium.

<sup>12</sup> A more accurate approach through adjusting the share of land transport between various European countries is not possible, as data on modal transport shares within Europe (i.e. EU-27) is not available. Alternatives based on distance between countries were studied as well, but proved to require complex assumptions and were difficult to verify while not guaranteeing a more accurate result.

<sup>13</sup> For instance, Brazil and Argentina share a land border but trade a little by land due to large distances between and position of their major economic centres that are located close to sea.

### 3.3. TNAP algorithm and calculations

39 Detailed calculations were made for trade with non-adjacent partners by combining bilateral trade flows with NAPs data (TNAP calculations). For each country first the country's trade with NAPs is calculated, and summed to provide the global trade with NAPs. Subsequently, each country's share of global trade with NAPs is calculated. The trade data from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) is used to obtain the following TNAP results for 2007 (for imports).

40 Without any adjustments, global imports from non-adjacent partners (i.e. from non-land-adjacent partners) accounted for just over three-quarters (76.7%), of imports from all partners. Of these, developed and developing countries accounted for 63.5% and 36.5%, respectively, according to author's calculations.

41 After the accuracy adjustments, for Europe, U.S., Canada and Latin America countries, the imports from NAPs accounted for 69.4% of global trade. Thus the adjustments reduce the share of imports from NAPs from approximately three-quarters to circa 70% of global trade. Of these, developed and developing countries accounted for circa 60% and 40%, respectively.

42 The global share of imports by sea and air is not officially tracked or reported. However, its various estimates are very close to 70%. Thus, it is warranted to use the TNAP algorithm to calculate the countries' share of import by sea and air.

### 3.4. Country share of global imports by sea and air

43 Using the TNAP approach, a country share of global imports by sea and air can be calculated for each country. Tables 1 and 2 provide such results for selected developed and developing countries respectively. These are shown together with the share of global imports by all modes of transport, for comparative purposes. Developed countries are defined as per Annex I of UNFCCC.

**Table 1: Developed countries' share of value of global imports in 2007 (author's calculations)**

| <b>Developed Country</b><br>(as per the UNFCC Annex I) | <b>Share of global imports, by<br/>sea and air</b><br>% | <b>Share of global imports, by<br/><u>all</u> transport modes</b><br>% |
|--|---|--|
| USA  | 15.97   | 14.43  |
| Japan  | 6.41  | 4.45   |
| Germany  | 4.60  | 7.58   |
| UK   | 3.96  | 4.47   |
| Italy  | 2.96  | 3.66   |
| France   | 2.60  | 4.37   |
| ...  | ...   | ...  |
| <b>All developed countries:</b>                        | <b>59.81</b>  | <b>66.84</b>   |

**Table 2: Developing countries' share of value of global imports in 2007 (author's calculations)**

| Developing Country/region        | Share of global imports, by<br>sea and air | Share of global imports, by<br>all transport modes |
|----------------------------------|--|--|
|                                  | %  | %  |
| China                            | 8.35                                       | 6.84   |
| Korea, Republic of               | 3.68                                       | 2.55   |
| Africa (all)                     | 3.48                                       | 2.56   |
| Singapore                        | 2.36                                       | 1.88   |
| China, Taiwan Province of        | 2.27                                       | 1.57   |
| China, Hong Kong SAR             | 2.06                                       | 2.65   |
| India                            | 1.98                                       | 1.56   |
| Mexico                           | 1.46                                       | 2.02   |
| Ethiopia                         | 0.06                                       | 0.04   |
| Guyana                           | 0.01                                       | 0.01   |
| ...                              | ...  | ...  |
| <b>All developing countries:</b> | <b>40.19</b>                               | <b>33.16</b>                                       |

44 As illustrated in Tables 1 and 2, the developed and developing countries accounted for circa two-thirds and one-third of global imports value respectively (for all transport modes). Developing countries clearly account for a higher share of global imports by sea and air (circa 40%) than by all transport mode modes of transport (circa 33%), while the opposite is true for developed countries. This reflects that generally land transport is more extensively used by developed than developing countries.

## 4. IMPACT OF DISTANCE

45 This section analyzes the impact of distance in attributing responsibility for emissions to countries and calculating impacts on the countries from a global MBM for shipping emissions. The concept of trade-weighted distance is introduced and is used to justify why distance is of less relevance, and can be omitted in the context of various efficiencies of ships used on different routes and distances.

### 4.1. Trade-weighted distances (TWD)

46 As the geographical location of countries differs significantly, it may seem that the distance over which a country trades with its partners, via air and sea, also varies significantly. However, a detailed analysis of bilateral trade patterns reveals that this is not the case. To further analyse this issue, a trade-weighted distance for international transportation (TWD) is defined as follows. The TWD is a nautical distance of the country from its trading partners weighted by their bilateral trade by air and sea (i.e. excludes trade by land). More specifically, it is calculated as a weighted average of bilateral distances and value of seaborne and airborne trade, of the country with each of its trading partners. Thus

the TWD is a single measure of a country's location relative to its trading partners, quantifying how far a country is from its (current) trading partners by sea.

47 A model is constructed to calculate the TWD by integrating:

- .1 Nautical distances between countries,
- .2 Bilateral trade flows by air and sea between countries.

48 The nautical distances are based on the UNCTAD Maritime Connectivity Data Base, kindly made available by UNCTAD. The trade flows by air and sea are calculated by the TNAP algorithm discussed. TNAP is applied to the value of bilateral trades (sum of imports and exports) obtained from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade).

49 The algorithm to calculate TWD for a country/region is as follows. For each of its trading partners, the nautical distance between the country and the partner is multiplied by their TNAP bilateral value. The results are summed and divided by the country's total TNAP value, thereby providing its TWD, i.e. the country's trade-weighted distance, by sea and air.<sup>14</sup>

50 TWD results for 124 countries/regions are shown in Figure 1, representing circa 97% of international trade in 2007 (as per UN Comtrade). The results are arranged from the highest to the lowest TWD, and split into two parts for clarity.


51 The results illustrate that the TWD variability is somewhere between 2,000 and 6,000 nautical miles (miles), for nearly all countries, with an average TWD under 4,000 miles. Only Chile has TWD greater than 7,000 miles, and only one country has TWD of less than 1,000 miles: the Bahamas. Eight countries have TWD greater than 6,000, and seven countries less than 2,000 miles.

52 Thus the countries that trade over largest distances are only circa three times further from their trading partners than countries that have smallest TWD, and only 50% further than the global average. Closer analysis reveals that the countries with the highest TWD, such as Chile, South Africa, Bangladesh, and Australia, trade with far away countries in large volumes.

---

<sup>14</sup> This approach differs slightly from calculations weighted by overall trade, presented in MEPC 61/INF.2, as those were based on overall trade flows, including by land. The TWD approach presented in this paper improves on the previous approach by including only trade by sea and air, and thus is deemed superior for analyzing international transport. For instance, in the previous analysis the trade distance of many European countries was relatively, which was not surprising given that the majority of the intra-European trade is carried by land, and involves mainly neighbouring countries.

**Figure 1:** Trade-weighted distances, international transport (TWD) (author's analysis)



53 On the other end of the spectrum, at low TWD, many of the countries are Small Island Developing States (SIDS), such as Dominica, Aruba, Jamaica, and other smaller countries. These countries trade mostly with their closest partners. The Bahamas has the lowest TWD, due to its proximity to the USA, by far its largest trading partner. The Russian Federation also has a relatively low TWD, but this should be interpreted with caution. The low value is related to its vast geographic area and how the nautical distances between countries are derived.<sup>15</sup>

54 The TWD on Figure 1 are calculated using trade data, but very similar results are obtained when import or export data are used. Thus, the above has shown that perhaps contrary to some expectations, the TWD does not vary greatly between countries. The ratio of largest to smallest TWD is only circa 3 for nearly all countries. Furthermore, majority of SIDS trade over smaller distances while many larger countries trade over longer distances.

## 4.2. Excluding distance from calculations

55 To justify why distance can be excluded from the attribution process (as used in the rebate mechanism) the combined effect of trading distance and ship efficiency is analyzed. According to industry data, the emission rate of smaller ships is circa 3 times lower than the emission rate of larger ships. This needs to be considered in the context of the TWD analysis, that the largest trading distances are circa 3 times greater than the smallest.<sup>16</sup>

56 The smaller ships often operate on shorter routes, and especially on routes to small countries. This is often related to small transport volume, smaller ports, and occasionally the remoteness from major trading routes. Thus many countries with relatively low TWD generally experience greater emissions per tonne-mile, than the countries with relatively high TWD, served by larger ships. Therefore these two measures, TWD and the average emission rate of ships serving a country are negatively correlated. Thus when these two measures are combined (multiplied), the resulting efficiency-distance distribution would be much flatter than the TWD itself – albeit not entirely flat. In fact, the efficiency-distance result for the small islands may be somewhat higher than for the countries with large TWD. Using the value measure for these islands would thus be more appropriate, given that prices of imported commodities and goods on these islands are higher than elsewhere.

57 Therefore including distance could bring only a marginal increase in the accuracy of attributing shipping emissions to different countries, if any, when compared with using just the value measure. Yet incorporating distance is administratively very complex given the need for detailed cargo and distance data, potentially from each of the tens of thousand ships worldwide. At the same time calculating incidence from an MBM on small countries, which experience higher costs of imported goods, the share of imports by value would reflect their incidence better than share of imports by volume.

---

<sup>15</sup> The bilateral distance in the model is equal the distance between two closest major ports of the given two countries. For the Russian Federation three ports are used: Novorossiysk, St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. One is selected for each partner. For instance for Japan Vladivostok is used, which is just under 1,000 nm from Tokyo, the port used for Japan. In reality not all trade between the Russian Federation and Japan is carried over such a relatively short distance.

<sup>16</sup> For instance emissions rates, in grams CO<sub>2</sub> per tonne-km of cargo carried are reported in the Second IMO GHG study 2009 as follows: crude oil tankers: from 2.9 - 9.1; bulk carriers 2.5 - 7.9; containers: 12.5 - 32 (from the larger to smaller ships, but excluding the smallest ships as they often do not operate internationally). Similar effect of scale was reported by IMarEST in the document MEPC 60/4/34.

58 Various reports have found that distance is not that strong a determinant of freight costs, which supports the above findings. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) studied the determinants of maritime transport costs, and found distance is a poor proxy for the costs. It concluded that the various other determinants such as ship size make the aggregate effect of distance complex (OECD 2008). Various researchers, based on empirical data, quantified the impact of distance on freight costs, and found it to be small. Doubling the distance led to an increase of maritime costs (including insurance) by circa 15-20% (see for instance Micco and Pérez 2002, Wilmsmeier and Hoffman 2008).

## 5. OPTIMAL ATTRIBUTION KEY AND ITS APPLICATION

59 The analysis in the previous section demonstrated that distance can and should be eliminated from calculations when a country incidence (cost burden) arising from a global MBM is assessed, without losing much accuracy while making such calculations feasible today. Thus the optimal attribution key to attribute the global cost burden to countries for which reliable data exist is the country's share of imports from non-adjacent countries (NAPs). These values are provided by the TNAP calculations.

60 Table 3 provides attribution (rebate) keys for example developing countries. The values are equal to the estimate of the countries' share of global imports by sea and air, as provided for some countries in Table 2.

61 The keys for 156 developing countries/regions are contained in the Appendix 2.

**Table 3: Rebate keys for selected developing countries, 2007 data (author's calculations)**

| Developing Country/region      | R Key, %     |
|--------------------------------|--------------|
| China                          | 8.35         |
| Korea, Republic of             | 3.68         |
| Singapore                      | 2.36         |
| Taiwan Province of China       | 2.27         |
| Hong Kong SAR, China           | 2.06         |
| India                          | 1.98         |
| Mexico                         | 1.46         |
| <i>Next 27</i>                 | 13.55        |
| Bangladesh                     | 0.16         |
| <i>Next 25</i>                 | 2.41         |
| Ethiopia                       | 0.06         |
| <i>Next 25</i>                 | 0.93         |
| Papua New Guinea               | 0.03         |
| <i>Next 25</i>                 | 0.45         |
| Guyana                         | 0.01         |
| <i>Remaining 40+ countries</i> | 0.44         |
| <b>TOTAL non-Annex I</b>       | <b>40.19</b> |

## 5.1. Integration conditions

62 As stated in MEPC 60/4/55, in principle the proposed RM could apply to any MBM, providing it generates enough gross revenue to cover the rebate needs. According to the original proposal, given that developing countries import approximately a third of goods worldwide by value (as shown in Table 2), the gross revenue of an MBM that can provide rebates for developing countries must be greater than 30% of the instrument's global cost burden. Based on the optimal rebate key proposed in this paper, the above condition may need to be changed to 40%, or another appropriate amount. However, given that some developing countries may pursue the option of foregoing all or part of their rebates, it is still viable to use the 30% as an illustrative integration condition.<sup>17</sup> As this is the only condition, any MBM based on a levy or a GHG contribution can directly use the proposed RM and the optimal rebate key, as its cost burden equals the gross revenue raised.

63 For an MBM based on emissions trading, such as cap-and-trade, the successful integration depends on the design of the MBM. For instance, the total economic cost of a cap-and-trade measure is the sum of (1) the cost of emission allowances distributed to the maritime sector and (2) the cost of emission allowances and credits purchased from other sectors. As the revenue in a cap-and-trade system is typically raised through emission allowance auctioning, only schemes that auction at least 30% of the emission allowances could apply the proposed rebate mechanism. For any scheme that assumes non-uniform application, for instance applying different charges based on the efficiency of ships, integration of the rebate mechanism would be more difficult. The cost burden for a given country would for such schemes depend on the efficiency of ships serving the country, and thus its rebate cannot be calculated easily.

## 5.2. Integration with MBM proposals

64 This section considers the various MBMs being considered at the IMO with a view to assessing the possibility of integrating the RM into these proposals. As introduced earlier, these include: ETS, GHG Fund, PSL, SECT, EIS, and RM. Given that the IMO is in the process of developing a potential MBM, these proposals should be seen as subject to changes and improvements, not as options set in stone. The RM has been submitted to the IMO by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as two options: the RM add-on which could be added or integrated into certain MBM proposals that raise revenue, and the RM integrated which is the IMERS proposal (see MEPC 60/4/55 and MEPC 61/5/33).

65 With the exception of SECT, all proposals anticipate that a MBM will generate revenue, and require a Fund to disburse it. The ETS, GHG Fund, PSL, and IMERS proposals would raise revenue from all participating ships, in a uniform manner (see MEPC 61/INF.2 for more details). Thus the RM add-on could apply to each of them, providing sufficient revenue is generated to cover the rebates.

66 The applicability of the RM to the MBMs being considered at the IMO is illustrated in Figure 2. The RM add-on could be easily integrated with the ETS, GHG Fund, and PSL proposals. The only proposal thus far that incorporates the RM is the IMERS scheme (RM


---

<sup>17</sup> For illustrative purposes only, the rebates corresponding to the imports of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China, Taiwan Province of China, South Korea, and Singapore, amount to around 10% of gross revenue. If the rebate that these entities were entitled to were foregone, the respective countries/regions could be recognized internationally for such action, given that in this proposal such decisions are voluntary in nature.

integrated), as described in the MEPC 61/5/33, and evaluated by the MBM-EG in MEPC 61/INF.2.

67 The RM add-on cannot apply to SECT, given that this scheme is not revenue generating. Applying the RM add-on to EIS would be complex, as EIS would only raise revenue from the non-compliant. Only ships failing to meet the required efficiency standard would be subject to a fee applied to each tonne of fuel consumed. Thus the cost burden to countries would depend on where the non-compliant, fee paying ships operate, as well as on the hidden cost of reaching the efficiency standard by the compliant ships. As a result, compensation based on a simple rebate key, such as the proposed country's share of global imports from non-adjacent countries, cannot apply. A much more complex rebate key would be required. Furthermore, the amount of revenue raised may not be sufficient to cover the rebates, given that the hidden cost may be significant.

**Figure 2:** *Applicability of rebate mechanism to various MBM (author's analysis)*



MBM legend:  
 EIS Efficiency Incentive Scheme  
 ETS Emission Trading System  
 GHG Fund International Fund for GHG emissions from ships  
 PSL Port State Levy  
 RM Rebate Mechanism; add-on, and integrated (IMERS)  
 SECT Ship Efficiency Credit Trading

68 To further clarify and generalize the findings, the MBMs are categorized in Figure 2 by the dominant characteristic or the type of MBM, reflecting their different designs. These are:

- .1 Quantity;
- .2 Price;
- .3 Efficiency.

69 The quantity proposals require a cap or target for the total quantity of GHG emissions from international maritime transport. The price proposals require a levy or a contribution (on

ship fuel or GHG emissions). The efficiency proposals require efficiency targets for existing ships.

70 Figure 2 illustrates only one possible categorization, as certain proposals employ features of a different type, or types, and thus their positions on the graph are illustrative. For instance, the GHG Fund proposal is categorized predominantly as a quantity measure, but some may see it as a price measure, given that it is based on GHG contribution per tonne of fuel bunkered. However, in this paper it is categorized predominantly as a quantity measure as it is the target line for emissions that is established first, that subsequently drives the level of GHG contribution. EIS partially belongs to the price category, as the level of fee or penalty on fuel for ships that do not comply with the efficiency standard needs to be set, and penalties collected. IMERS partially belongs to the quantity category, as its market-based levy may be driven by economy-wide quantity emission targets, and furthermore the country's share of net shipping emissions, calculated through the attribution key, may be included within the national emission target, if so decided. The positioning of these proposals between the different types aims to illustrate their hybrid features.

71 Thus, Figure 2 shows that generally the RM can apply to quantity and price measures, but not to measures based on efficiency. This relates to the need to (1) generate revenue and (2) the scheme being applied in a uniform manner across the fleet, irrespective of ship efficiency, age, and so on. Figure 2 also illustrates that the RM add-on and IMERS (RM integrated) can ensure no net incidence on developing countries from the maritime MBM, country-by-country. The ETS, GHG Fund, PSL, SECT and EIS proposals, as currently defined, do not ensure a zero net incidence on individual developing countries from their implementation.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

72 As this study has demonstrated, it is feasible to implement the principles of equity and CBDR in a maritime MBM through the proposed RM, or any similar approach that can deliver no "net incidence" on developing countries.

73 After extensive research, the country share of value of global imports from non-adjacent partners (after simple adjustments for trade patterns in Europe and in Latin America), is identified as the most appropriate proxy for a country's cost burden from a global maritime MBM, which is readily available and does not require significant adjustment. Thus optimal attribution or rebate has been identified.

74 According to the calculations presented, in 2007 circa 70% of global trade by value was transported by sea and air. Of this, developed and developing countries accounted for circa 60% and 40% respectively. Thus, the estimate of total incidence on developing countries from a global maritime MBM is circa 40% of its global costs. This is more than the 30% estimate based on value share of imports by all modes of transport. However, given that some developing countries may pursue the option of foregoing all or part of their rebates, it is still viable to continue to use the 30% as an illustrative integration condition for a global maritime MBM with "no net incidence" on developing countries.

75 The RM with the optimal rebate key can be integrated into almost all revenue-raising schemes currently being considered by the IMO. Once integrated, the net revenue raised would come from developed countries, complying with the relevant UNFCCC provisions and commitments. Furthermore, the proposed RM provides important additional flexibility for a country to forego the rebate or part of it. This seems the optimal way to creatively reconcile

the principles of the IMO and the UNFCCC, as well as take into account various national circumstances.

76 Rebating to developing countries the cost burden (incidence) generated by the MBM is more straightforward than the complete exemption of these countries from the application of the MBM. This will also ensure that the MBM can be easily implemented globally. Approximately, only 150 rebates are to be issued i.e. one rebate for each developing country. With data required to calculate the rebates being readily available, the rebates could be issued annually, or more frequently. The attribution keys for 190 countries, that are rebates to developing countries, have been calculated in this study based on data trade data for 2007 and can be used for various scenario or validation country-by-country. The results are in the Appendix 2.

77 In summary, the quantified analysis demonstrates that it is feasible to create an equitable revenue-generating MBM that can reconcile the principles and provisions of the UNFCCC with a global IMO regime for all ships. Such an approach could break the current impasse and facilitate swift progress in this longstanding and controversial area of reducing GHG emissions from international shipping. Considering the overriding imperative to act globally to address the impact of climate change and growing shipping emissions, such an innovative and practical approach seems timely, justified and potentially transformative.

## Bibliography

- AGF (2010a) 'Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing' (AGF), New York, USA;  
[http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF\\_reports/AGF%20Report.pdf](http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/AGF%20Report.pdf)
- AGF (2010b) 'Work Stream 2: Paper on potential revenues from international maritime and aviation sector policy measures', The Secretary-General's High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing' (AGF), New York, USA;  
[http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF\\_reports/Workstream\\_2\\_International\\_Transport\\_Revised.pdf](http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/climatechange/shared/Documents/AGF_reports/Workstream_2_International_Transport_Revised.pdf)
- GHG-WG 3/3/2, 'Consolidated proposal of "Efficiency Incentive Scheme" based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme and the Vessel Efficiency System', submitted by Japan and the World Shipping Council (WSC), International Maritime Organization (IMO), London, 2011.
- GHG-WG 3/3/11, 'Towards an optimal rebate key for a global maritime MBM', submitted by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), IMO, London, 2011.
- Gilbert P. and Bows A. and Starkey R. (2010) 'Shipping and climate change: Scope for unilateral action', The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK;  
<http://documents.manchester.ac.uk/display.aspx?DocID=8127>
- Hummels, D. (2009), 'Globalization and Freight Transport Costs in Maritime Shipping and Aviation', International Transport Forum, Paper 2009-3, OECD/ITF, Paris, France;  
[www.internationaltransportforum.org/2009/workshops/pdf/Hummels.pdf](http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/2009/workshops/pdf/Hummels.pdf).
- IMF (2009), Direction of Trade Statistics(DOTS), International Monetary Fund, Washington DC.
- IMO (2009), Second IMO GHG study 2009, MEPC 59/INF.10, MEPC 59/INF.10/Corr.1, International Maritime Organization, London, UK.
- Korinek J. and Sourdin P. (2009) 'Clarifying Trade Costs: Maritime Transport and its Effect on Agricultural Trade', OECD Trade Policy Working Papers, no. 92, OECD Publishing.
- MEPC 60/4/8, 'An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas emissions from ships', submitted by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and the International Parcel Tankers Association (IPTA), International Maritime Organization (IMO), London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/12, 'Further details on the United States proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping', submitted by the United States, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/22, 'A further outline of a Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for International Shipping', submitted by Norway, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/26, 'A global emissions trading system for greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping', submitted by the United Kingdom, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/37, 'Consideration of a market-based mechanism: Leveraged Incentive Scheme to improve the energy efficiency of ships based on the International GHG Fund', submitted by Japan, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/39, 'Proposal to Establish a Vessel Efficiency System (VES), submitted by the World Shipping Council, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/40, 'Achieving reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from ships through Port State arrangements utilizing the ship traffic, energy and environment model, STEEM', submitted by Jamaica, IMO, London, 2010.

- MEPC 60/4/41, 'Further elements for the development of an Emissions Trading System for International Shipping', submitted by France, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 60/4/55, 'A rebate mechanism for a market-based instrument for international shipping', submitted by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 61/5/16, 'Further details on the United States proposal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from international shipping', submitted by the United States, IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 61/5/33, 'Further information on a rebate mechanism for a market-based measure for international shipping', submitted by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), IMO, London, 2010.
- MEPC 61/INF.2, 'Full report of the work undertaken by the Expert Group on Feasibility Study and Impact Assessment of possible Market-based Measures', also MEPC 61/INF.2/Corr.1, MEPC 61/INF.2/Corr.2, IMO, London, 2010.
- Micco A. and Pérez N. (2002), 'Determinants of Maritime Transport Costs', Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department Working paper 441, Washington DC, USA; <http://www.iadb.org/res/publications/pubfiles/pubWP-441.pdf>
- OECD (2008), 'Clarifying trade costs in maritime transport', Working Party of the Trade Committee, Trade and Agriculture Directorate, TAD/TC/WP(2008)10, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Stochniol, A. (2009a) 'A levy on fuel for international shipping, which differentiates responsibilities between developed and developing countries', Multi-year expert meeting on Transport and Trade Facilitation, Maritime and Climate Change Challenge, UNCTAD, Geneva, Switzerland; [http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/cimem1p20\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/cimem1p20_en.pdf)
- Stochniol, A. (2009b) 'Memorandum for the UK's Environmental Enquiry', Reducing CO<sub>2</sub> and other emissions from shipping, Fourth Report of Session 2008-09, House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, HC 528, pp 57-61/Ev9-13, London, UK; <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmenvaud/528/528.pdf>
- UNCTAD (2010a) 'Oil Prices and Maritime Freight Rates: An Empirical Investigation', Technical Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, UNCTAD/DTL/TLB/2009/2, United Nations; [http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dtltlb20092\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/dtltlb20092_en.pdf)
- UNCTAD (2010b) Review of Maritime Transport 2010, Report by the UNCTAD secretariat, United Nations, New York and Geneva; <http://www.unctad.org>.
- UNCTAD (2010c) UNCTAD handbook of statistics 2010, United Nations, New York and Geneva; [http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdstat34\\_enfr.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdstat34_enfr.pdf)
- UNFCCC (2010), Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, Cancun, Mexico; [http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop\\_16/application/pdf/cop16\\_lca.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf)
- U.S. Department of Transportation (2010), Research and Innovative Technology Administration, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 'Freight Transportation: Global Highlights, 2010', Washington, DC; [http://www.bts.gov/publications/freight\\_transportation/pdf/entire.pdf](http://www.bts.gov/publications/freight_transportation/pdf/entire.pdf)
- Wilmsmeier G. and Hoffman J. (2008) 'Liner Shipping Connectivity and Port Infrastructure as Determinants of Freight Rates in the Caribbean', Maritime Economics & Logistics, 10, pp 130-151
- World Bank (2009), World Development Report 2010, Development and Climate Change, World Bank, Washington, USA.

## Appendix 1 – Overview of Proposals

78 The following provides a brief overview of the six market-based measure (MBM) proposals being considered by the International Maritime Organization, namely:

- .1 International Fund for GHG emissions from ships (GHG Fund);
- .2 Emission Trading System (ETS);
- .3 Port State Levy (PSL);
- .4 Ship Efficiency Credit Trading (SECT);
- .5 Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS);
- .6 Rebate Mechanism (RM).

**1 An International Fund for Greenhouse Gas emissions from ships (GHG Fund) proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and IPTA (MEPC 60/4/8)** – would establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set by either UNFCCC or IMO. Emissions above the target line would be offset largely by purchasing approved emission reduction credits. The offsetting activities would be financed by a contribution paid by ships on every tonne of bunker fuel purchased. It is envisaged that contributions would be collected through bunker fuel suppliers or via direct payment from shipowners. The contribution rate would be adjusted at regular intervals to ensure that sufficient funds are available to purchase project credits to achieve the agreed target line. Any additional funds remaining would be available for adaptation and mitigation activities via the UNFCCC and R&D and technical co-operation within the IMO framework.

**2 The global Emission Trading System (ETS) for international shipping proposal by Norway (MEPC 60/4/22), by the United Kingdom (MEPC 60/4/26), and by France (MEPC 60/4/41)** – would set a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international shipping and establish a trading mechanism to facilitate the necessary emission reductions, be they in-sector or out-of-sector. The use of out-of-sector credits allows for further growth of the shipping sector beyond the cap. In addition the auction revenue would be used to provide for adaptation and mitigation (additional emission reductions) through UNFCCC processes and R&D of clean technologies within the maritime sector. A number of allowances (Ship Emission Units) corresponding to the cap would be released into the market each year. It is proposed that the units would be released via a global auctioning process. Ships would be required to surrender one Ship Emission Unit, or one recognized out-of-sector allowance or one recognized out-of-sector project credit, for each tonne of CO<sub>2</sub> they emit.

The Norwegian ETS would apply to all CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the use of fossil fuels by ships engaged in international trade above a certain size threshold. The proposal also indicates that limited exemptions could be provided for specific voyages to Small Island Developing States.

Two aspects of the UK proposal that differ from the Norwegian ETS proposal are the method of allocating emissions allowances and the approach for setting the emissions cap. The UK proposal suggests that allowances could be allocated to national governments for auctioning. It also suggests the net emission cap would be set with a

long term declining trajectory with discrete phases (for example, five to eight years) with an initial introductory or transitional phase of one to two years.

The French proposal sets out additional detail on auction design under a shipping ETS. In all other aspect the proposal is similar to the Norwegian proposal for an international ETS.

- 3 Port State Levy (PSL) proposed by Jamaica (MEPC 60/4/40)** – calls for an IMO global agreement, in which Member States participate by levying a uniform emissions charge on all vessels calling at their respective ports based on the amount of fuel consumed by the respective vessel on its voyage to that port (not bunker suppliers). The proposal is directly aimed at reducing maritime emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> without regard to design, operations, or energy source. The Port State Levy would be structured to achieve the global reduction targets for GHG and could be leveraged in a manner as proposed by Japan to reward vessels exceeding efficiency targets.
- 4 The Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT) proposed by the United States (MEPC 60/4/12, MEPC 61/5/16)** – is designed to focus emission reduction activities just in the shipping sector. Under SECT, all ships, including those in the existing fleet, would be subject to mandatory energy efficiency standards, rather than a cap on emissions or a surcharge on fuel. As one means of complying with the standard, SECT would establish an efficiency-credit trading programme. The stringency level of these efficiency standards would be based on energy efficiency technology and methods available to ships in the fleet. These standards would become more stringent over time, as new technology and methods are introduced. Similar to the EEDI, these efficiency standards would be based on a reduction from an established baseline and would establish efficiency standards for both new and existing ships. The SECT is designed to achieve relative GHG reductions, i.e. reductions in emissions per tonne mile and not to set an overall target for the sector.
- 5 The Efficiency Incentive Scheme (EIS) proposed by Japan and the World Shipping Council (WSC; GHG-WG 3/3/2)** – consolidated proposal based on the Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) proposed by Japan (MEPC 60/4/37) and the Vessel Efficiency System (VES) proposed by WSC (MEPC 60/4/39) – would establish mandatory efficiency standards for both new and existing ships. Each vessel would be judged against a requirement to improve its efficiency by X% below the average efficiency (the baseline) for the specific vessel class and size. Ships failing to meet the required standard through technical modifications would be subject to a contribution rate or fee (Y) applied to each tonne of fuel consumed. Fee Y would be in proportion to how far the ship's efficiency is from a pre-set value, or exemption point for payment of the fee. The ship efficiency would be defined by the EEDI, applied to both new and existing ships. The pre-set exemption point for existing ships would be less stringent from the one established for new ships, in view of limited options for technical measures that can be applied to existing ships, and the aging degradation of ship performance. The method of collecting contributions from ships would be based on direct transfers to the IMO International GHG Fund (i.e. without passing through the bunker fuel suppliers). Each ship would have its own electronic account with the IMO number serving to identify each account in the GHG Fund. The revenue from GHG contributions would be allocated for: 1) further in-sector emission reductions through research and development projects to develop even higher efficiency in the fleet, and for 2) funding other projects consistent with guidance to be set forth in the new instrument.

- 6 The Rebate Mechanism (RM) proposal by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN; MEPC 60/4/55, MEPC 61/5/33)** – focuses on a Rebate Mechanism to compensate developing countries for the financial impact of an MBM. A developing country's rebate would be calculated on the basis of their share of global costs of the MBM, using readily available data on a developing country's share of global imports by value as a proxy for that share (replaced in 2011 by a share of global imports from non-adjacent partners). The proposal demonstrates that, in principle, the Rebate Mechanism could be applied to any maritime MBM which generates revenue such as a levy and an ETS. This generic version is called the RM add-on. The RM has been integrated with the International Maritime Emission Reduction Scheme (IMERS), inter alia, to illustrate how it can be operationalized. This version is referred to as RM integrated (MEPC 61/INF.2), or IMERS (MEPC 61/5/33). Under the IMERS scheme, a market-driven levy is established on fuel bunkered. The levy would apply to all ships over a predetermined size, engaged in international maritime transport, irrespective of their flag and nationality of the shipowner. The liable entity in the scheme is a ship, uniquely identified by its IMO number. The levy can be linked to a prevailing fee on land transport emissions, or to the rolling average market carbon price, as available. It is set constant though for a quarter, at least 30 days in advance of the start of each quarter (the period may be longer than a quarter, if so agreed). In order to increase investment certainty, the levy is bounded by a predetermined price floor and ceiling established for +20 years. Fuel bunkered in a given quarter must be electronically reported and is subject to payment of the constant levy for that quarter. The levy is obtained centrally, bypassing national coffers, and aggregated providing the scheme's gross revenue. A computer-based system and simple processes are defined for reporting of fuel bunkered, payment of the levy, status check, enforcement, and certification of ships, and disbursement of revenue raised. The RM applies in the first step of the disbursement process. The entire net revenue raised is to be disbursed through existing institutions for (1) adaptation to climate change in developing countries; (2) reduction of emissions, including from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+); (3) technology R&D, transfer, and transformation in the shipping sector. It is proposed to reserve a significant pool of adaptation funding to the most vulnerable Small Islands Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Furthermore, setting of the ship size threshold higher than 400 GT is proposed for an initial period of time.

## Appendix 2 – Rebate and Attribution Keys

**Table 4:** Rebate keys for developing countries/regions, 2007 data (author's calculations)

| Country/region               | R Key % | Country/region               | R Key % | Country/region               | R Key % |
|------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|---------|------------------------------|---------|
| Afghanistan                  | 0.0238  | Gambia                       | 0.0030  | Nigeria                      | 0.3311  |
| Albania                      | 0.0346  | Georgia                      | 0.0360  | Niue                         | 0.0001  |
| Algeria                      | 0.2820  | Ghana                        | 0.0727  | Oman                         | 0.1176  |
| Angola                       | 0.0893  | Grenada                      | 0.0038  | Pakistan                     | 0.2747  |
| Antigua and Barbuda          | 0.0075  | Guatemala                    | 0.1182  | Palau                        | 0.0018  |
| Argentina                    | 0.3586  | Guinea                       | 0.0126  | Panama                       | 0.0655  |
| Armenia                      | 0.0282  | Guinea-Bissau                | 0.0010  | Papua New Guinea             | 0.0273  |
| Azerbaijan                   | 0.0404  | Guyana                       | 0.0101  | Paraguay                     | 0.0340  |
| Bahamas                      | 0.0320  | Haiti                        | 0.0156  | Peru                         | 0.1676  |
| Bahrain                      | 0.1130  | Honduras                     | 0.0577  | Philippines                  | 0.5980  |
| Bangladesh                   | 0.1565  | India                        | 1.9806  | Qatar                        | 0.2129  |
| Barbados                     | 0.0134  | Indonesia                    | 0.6912  | Rwanda                       | 0.0056  |
| Belize                       | 0.0059  | Iran (Islamic Rep. of)       | 0.4176  | Saint Kitts and Nevis        | 0.0028  |
| Benin                        | 0.0103  | Iraq                         | 0.1952  | Saint Lucia                  | 0.0063  |
| Bhutan                       | 0.0049  | Israel                       | 0.5823  | Saint Vincent and the Grenad | 0.0034  |
| Bolivia                      | 0.0177  | Jamaica                      | 0.0695  | Samoa                        | 0.0027  |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina       | 0.0724  | Jordan                       | 0.1048  | San Marino                   | 0.0000  |
| Botswana                     | 0.0370  | Kazakhstan                   | 0.1729  | Sao Tome and Principe        | 0.0008  |
| Brazil                       | 1.1268  | Kenya                        | 0.0907  | Saudi Arabia                 | 0.8851  |
| Brunei Darussalam            | 0.0195  | Kiribati                     | 0.0007  | Senegal                      | 0.0502  |
| Burkina Faso                 | 0.0158  | Korea, Dem. People's Rep. of | 0.0153  | Serbia                       | 0.1593  |
| Burundi                      | 0.0042  | Korea, Rep. of               | 3.6796  | Seychelles                   | 0.0089  |
| Cambodia                     | 0.0492  | Kuwait                       | 0.2070  | Sierra Leone                 | 0.0041  |
| Cameroon                     | 0.0350  | Kyrgyzstan                   | 0.0168  | Singapore                    | 2.3585  |
| Cape Verde                   | 0.0076  | Lao People's Democratic Rep  | 0.0099  | Solomon Islands              | 0.0029  |
| Central African Republic     | 0.0021  | Lebanon                      | 0.1197  | Somalia                      | 0.0044  |
| Chad                         | 0.0240  | Lesotho                      | 0.0179  | South Africa                 | 0.8077  |
| Chile                        | 0.3783  | Liberia                      | 0.0047  | Sri Lanka                    | 0.1174  |
| China                        | 8.3490  | Libyan Arab Jamahiriya       | 0.0627  | Sudan                        | 0.0970  |
| China, Hong Kong SAR         | 2.0579  | Macedonia (the former Yugo:  | 0.0421  | Suriname                     | 0.0097  |
| China, Macao SAR             | 0.0322  | Madagascar                   | 0.0252  | Swaziland                    | 0.0118  |
| Taiwan Province of China     | 2.2651  | Malawi                       | 0.0113  | Syrian Arab Republic         | 0.1396  |
| Colombia                     | 0.2847  | Malaysia                     | 1.1751  | Tajikistan                   | 0.0228  |
| Comoros                      | 0.0012  | Maldives                     | 0.0113  | Tanzania, United Rep. of     | 0.0595  |
| Congo                        | 0.0277  | Mali                         | 0.0147  | Thailand                     | 1.3440  |
| Congo (Democratic Rep. of th | 0.0274  | Malta                        | 0.0510  | Timor-Leste                  | 0.0043  |
| Cook Islands                 | 0.0011  | Marshall Islands             | 0.0007  | Togo                         | 0.0077  |
| Costa Rica                   | 0.1283  | Mauritania                   | 0.0133  | Tonga                        | 0.0015  |
| Côte d'Ivoire                | 0.0682  | Mauritius                    | 0.0402  | Trinidad and Tobago          | 0.0790  |
| Cuba                         | 0.1123  | Mexico                       | 1.4594  | Tunisia                      | 0.1872  |
| Cyprus                       | 0.0902  | Micronesia (Federated State: | 0.0004  | Turkmenistan                 | 0.0213  |
| Djibouti                     | 0.0044  | Moldova, Rep. of             | 0.0263  | Tuvalu                       | 0.0002  |
| Dominica                     | 0.0020  | Mongolia                     | 0.0075  | Uganda                       | 0.0308  |
| Dominican Republic           | 0.1415  | Montenegro                   | 0.0298  | United Arab Emirates         | 1.2684  |
| Ecuador                      | 0.1196  | Morocco                      | 0.3182  | Uruguay                      | 0.0354  |
| Egypt                        | 0.2499  | Mozambique                   | 0.0210  | Uzbekistan                   | 0.0450  |
| El Salvador                  | 0.0790  | Myanmar                      | 0.0304  | Vanuatu                      | 0.0021  |
| Equatorial Guinea            | 0.0288  | Namibia                      | 0.0089  | Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. o | 0.3620  |
| Eritrea                      | 0.0066  | Nauru                        | 0.0008  | Viet Nam                     | 0.5119  |
| Ethiopia                     | 0.0592  | Nepal                        | 0.0274  | Yemen                        | 0.0827  |
| Fiji                         | 0.0184  | Nicaragua                    | 0.0325  | Zambia                       | 0.0388  |
| Gabon                        | 0.0204  | Niger                        | 0.0090  | Zimbabwe                     | 0.0130  |

**Table 5: Attribution keys for developed countries, 2007 data (author's calculations)\***

| Country        | Attr Key % | Country                  | Attr Key % |
|----------------|------------|--------------------------|------------|
| Australia      | 1.5983     | Latvia                   | 0.0958     |
| Austria        | 0.4521     | Lithuania                | 0.1143     |
| Belarus        | 0.0910     | Luxembourg               | 0.0506     |
| Belgium        | 1.6705     | Netherlands              | 2.3298     |
| Bulgaria       | 0.2399     | New Zealand              | 0.3177     |
| Canada         | 1.9773     | Norway                   | 0.4904     |
| Croatia        | 0.2318     | Poland                   | 0.7256     |
| Czech Republic | 0.4328     | Portugal                 | 0.5020     |
| Denmark        | 0.3991     | Romania                  | 0.5534     |
| Estonia        | 0.1123     | Russian Federation       | 1.3992     |
| Finland        | 0.6018     | Slovakia                 | 0.3236     |
| France         | 2.6018     | Slovenia                 | 0.0961     |
| Germany        | 4.6015     | Spain                    | 3.0122     |
| Greece         | 0.7362     | Sweden                   | 0.9112     |
| Hungary        | 0.4480     | Switzerland              | 0.5129     |
| Iceland        | 0.0690     | Turkey                   | 1.6386     |
| Ireland        | 0.5932     | Ukraine                  | 0.5624     |
| Italy          | 2.9651     | United Kingdom           | 3.9644     |
| Japan          | 6.4161     | United States of America | 15.9771    |

\* Accuracy of attribution keys for individual EU-27 countries is generally lower than for others, and cannot be easily improved at present as data on intra-EU transport modal shares is not available. However, the accuracy of attribution to the EU-27 as a whole is comparable to the other countries, as individual attribution inaccuracies generally balance out in the EU-27 total, calculated as 28.5%. This total attribution key for EU-27 excludes Malta and Cyprus, as these two EU countries were not Annex-I parties in 2007 (their attribution keys are included in Table 4). Since then Malta has become an Annex-I party by decision 3/CP.15 of the UNFCCC.