



# **IMERS**

A levy on fuel for international shipping, which differentiates responsibilities between developed and developing countries

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## **Two Problems ...**



- Current mechanisms to finance climate change adaptation in developing countries are inadequate, both in scale and design
  - The financing gap is huge, circa 100:1
    - Tens of \$billions are needed annually
    - Available total: \$0.4bn

Yet the poorest countries are most vulnerable, will be hit hardest by climate change and did not create the problem



#### **Financing gap**

\$0.4bn

# 2. International shipping CO2 emissions are outside of the Kyoto Protocol

- x2 aviation emissions
- Significant and rapidly growing
- Attempts to address them have failed
- Regulation needs to comply with the differentiated climate regime (CBDR)
- Global and complex

#### \$50bn

#### **Example:**


How to attribute ship's emissions:

- Swiss owned
- Flying Liberia flag
- Chartered by Danish company
- Leaving Saudi Arabia
- Cargo for NY, and Shanghai
- Via international waters




- International shipping CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would form one emission bubble (no allocation to countries)
- Ships would be liable to pay a levy on fuel for transporting goods to:
  - Rich countries only: @100% (rich = Annex I countries)
  - Poor countries only: 0%
  - Both to rich & poor: 60%, on average
    - Based on % of goods transported to rich countries annually by the ship/company
    - Enforcement in Annex I ports: pay up 100% or prove you should pay less
- Level of levy would be determined by an emission cap and the market carbon price (cap-and-levy; by a formula not a political body)
  - Levy paid to the central ship account bypassing national coffers!
    - Based on already compulsory fuel receipts
  - 100% of revenue generated goes to climate change





(1 statistical ratio needed to qualify for a lower payment)





EXAMPLE	Number of full containers (TEUs) unloaded/transported to: (illustrative)		
Ports	A1	non-A1 (incl. trans-shipments)	TOTAL
Asia	200	2,000	2,000
US	2,800	-	3,000
Total	3,000	2,000	5,000

A1 cargo ratio: **60%** (i.e. emission payment = 0.6 x fuel used x levy level)

#### Outcome



- Worldwide, the share of goods transported to Annex I is **60%** 
  - Day 1 of scheme: 60% of maritime emissions covered, with an ambitious emission cap e.g. 20% emission reductions for Annex I (by 2020)

## • Easily Affordable:

- Marginal cost: just +0.1% on import prices to Annex I (\$1 per \$1,000)
- No impact on imports to non-Annex I



# Significant Impact:

FUNDS pa*	2013
Mitigation	2.5
Adaptation	2.5
Technology	1

\* In \$billions per annum


TOTAL: \$6bn+



- A central, supra-national differentiated approach would:
  - Resolve the conundrum of reconciling the need for Global rules (as per the IMO) with Differentiated responsibilities (as per the UNFCCC)
  - Efficiently combine a cap with carbon price through cap-and-levy
  - Eliminate several barriers such as emission allocation allowing rapid start; it could operate from 2013 vs. decades for the separate countryby-country approach
- Its implementation would:
  - Provide an effective centralized system rather than patchwork of multiple variants for different flag states
  - Be future-proof, by being automatically compatible with any CC regime as it allows taking emission deviation commitments, and similar
- Importantly, it would create a new governance to effectively address emissions that are inherently beyond national jurisdictions
  - Legal under international laws and rules (UNCLOS, WTO, GATT; would use IOPC Funds as the precedent for direct collection of funds)


How does IMERS compare with a cap-and-trade scheme? Barriers 1 – 3






#### How does IMERS compare with a cap-and-trade scheme? Issues 4 – 6






How does IMERS compare with a cap-and-trade scheme? Value 7 – 11



IMER

#### How does IMERS compare with a cap-and-trade scheme? Comparison Summary






## Use of Funds FAQ 6 & 7



- 6. What would the funds be used for? Who would benefit most?
  - Mitigation, Adaptation &
    Technology →
  - LDCs & SIDS would benefit most



- 7. Where does the money for adaptation come from?
  - Aggregated demand provides access to cheaper emission credits
  - Generated gains are utilized to address adaptation issues

## Conclusion



- The proposed differentiated levy:
  - Is equitable, clear, predictable and effective
  - By being collected centrally provides 100% payout to climate action
  - In contrast to cap-and-trade, it can be rapidly and cheaply implemented
    - Neither large bureaucracy nor complex reporting is required
  - It is underpinned by existing law and trade rules
- From our experience, it still requires:
  - Proactive approach to scale up (including submissions & financial support)
  - Practical solution demonstrators to convince sceptics
  - Mobilization of various stakeholders
- UNCTAD could take a leading role to obtain expert consensus for IMERS:
  - Submissions from developing countries are still needed



- A technically sound and politically acceptable levy on fuel for international shipping, which differentiates responsibilities between developed and developing countries
- Applied worldwide, collected centrally bypassing national coffers – raising \$6bn+ annually for climate action

"It is one of the least controversial and most effective ways to generate significant additional climate change funding"

Online: www.imers.org/geneva